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THE LINE·ITEM VETO
TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1989
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

_.\
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Hatch and Specter.

(1)

2
II

lOlST CONGRESS
1ST S ESSION

S•J• RES • 14

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to allow the
President to veto items of appropriation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr.
AI.LOP, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. D' A~lATO, Mr.
- PRESSLER, Mr. BOND, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. SYMMS, Mr.
EXON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. BURDICK, Mr.
CONRAD, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. DOLE, and
Mr. LUCiAR) introduced the following joint r('solution; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on the IJ udiciary

,,1

JOINT RES"O LUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States to allow the President to veto items of appropriation.

1

RelJolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United Stales of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 10\\1ng article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu- -

5 tion, which shall be valid tOi all intents and purposes as part
6 of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three7 fourth. of the everal States within seven yea.rs after the date
8 of it. IUbmi .ion to the States lor ratification:

.r
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[Recess.]
Senator SIMON. I apologize. It has just been one of those days
where things have not gone well timewise.
I am pleased to have you here, and let me call first on Mr.
Arnold Cantor, the assistant director of the economic research department of the AFL-CIO.
Mr. Cantor.
PAN~~L

CONSISTING OF ARNOLD CANTOR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
ECONOMIC Rf.~SEARCH DEPARTMEN1\ AFL-CIO; NEAL DEVINS,
ASSISTANT PRO.'f.~SSOR OF LAW, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND
MARY; AND LOUIS FISHER, SENIOR AMERICAN SPECIALIST,
GOVI~RNMENT DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.
I(~ .~

STATEMENT OF ARNOLD CANTOR

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Senator. I will kind of paraphrase. I
assume the full statement will go in the record.
Senator S IMON. We will put your full statements in the record.
Mr. C ANTOR. Thank you. On behalf of the AFL- CIO, we are appearing in opposition to both the measures. We would also oppose

.

'
:.
·
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establishing such authority through statute. We believe that the
President has sufficient power and opportunity under existing law
to assert his influence and control over the budget and appropriations processes, as well as on a program-by-program or line-by-line
basis.
First, and perhaps of greatest importance, is the fact that a lineitem veto goes far beyond budgetary matters and involves far more
than a simpie procedural change. We believe the line-item veto, in
effect, would give the Executive powers to amend legislation, substitute his will fot that of the Congress, and thereby substantially
alter the present mix and balance of powers between the executive
and legislative branches of government.
In terms of direct and specific line-item powers, under the
Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974 the President can
utilize the rescission process, and although both Houses must approvE. the rescission by a simple majority, the record clearly demonstrates that the President does get his way.
In addition, there are basic powers of the Executive to garner
media coverage and get public attention focused on any line-item
program he feels is not worthwhile. The President has the power to
call Congress into special session as a means to aSRert his will and
influence, and the present veto power of the President can and is
used as a threat and a bargaining chip to influence the shape of
any line item.
The President can also request supplemental appropriations, and
the sequestration procedure provides additional opportunities for
the administration to influence the funding of particular programs.
We also feel that the Congress, particularly as a result of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, has
more than enough procedural constraints and limitations on its
budgetary powers.
Line-item veto authority could complicate and politicize the
budget process in a fashion that could be contrary to the national
interest, and at the same time have, at best, a minuscule effect on
the overall spending and revenue totals and the size of the deficit.
It is unlikely that line-item veto power would apply uniformly
throughout the budget. Rather, for one reason or another, significant portions of the budget could or would not be subject to the
veto power.
We also feel that the figures imply that the relatively few programs that. are controllable would be disproportionately burdened.
This, in our view, could lead to a counterproductive game of budgetary chicken' between the White House and the Congress~ with
certain programs held host~ge by the administration's line-item
veto _power. Also, w~ feel there is the potential for a highly partisan White House to use the th"~at of veto power for electoral gain.
Thus, we do not feel that such circumstances would be conducive
to the development of a budget that reflects the Nation's priorities
and spells out the manner in which those priorities will be financed, nor we do believe that the line-item veto accords with the
Congres ' legislative anthority as envisioned by the drafters of the
Constitutjon ,
Thank you,
(The prepared statement of Mr. Cantor follows:]
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Testimony of Arnold cantor, Assistant Director, Economic Research Department
American Federation of Labor and Congress of industrial Organizations
and

Jerry D. Klepner, Director of Legislation
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Senate Committee of Judiciary
on SJ. 1. and 5.3. 23, Line Item Veto

April 11, 1989
We -are pleased to appear on behalf of the AFL-CIO in opposition to measures to
expand the powers of the President through establishment of a line-item veto.
We are opposed to granting of such powers through the Constitutional amendment
route as called for in S.J. 14 and S.J. 23, the two resolutions before this subcoIT.mittee, and
we would also oppose estabkishing such authority by statute.
We believe that the President has sufficient power and opportunity under existing laws
to assert his influence and control over the federal budget and appropriations process as well
as on a program-by-program or line-by-line basis.
First, and of perhaps greatest importance is the fact that a line-item veto goes far
beyond budgetary matters and involves far more than a simple pr0c::..dural change.

We

believe the line-item veto in effect would give the executive powers to amend legislation,
substitute his will for that of the Congress and thereby substantialIy alter the present mix
and balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government.
Under current budget procedures the President's powers are formidable. It is first of
all the President who is empowered to take the initiative by developing a detailed
comprehensive budget and submitting his budget to the Congress.

It is the President's

budget that establishes the overall framework and the context within which compromises
are made and a federal budget is ultimately developed.
Moreover in terms of direct and specific line-item powers, under the Budget Control
and Impoundment Act of 1974 the President can utilize the rescission process.

Although
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-2both houses must approve of the rescission by simple majority the
demonstrates that the President gets his way.
JI~dministration,

record clearly

In the first two years of the Reagan

for example, Congress approved 80 percent of the rescission requests, and

during the past eight years, 32 percent of the number of rescissions were approved
representing 95 percent of the dollar cuts recommended ($43.8 billion).
In addition of course:
(I)

there are basic powers of the Executive to garner media coverage and get public

attention focussed on any line-item program he feels is not worthwhile;
(2)

the President has the power to call Congress into special session as a means to

assert his will and influence; and
(3)

the present veto power of the President can, and is used as a threat and a

bargaining chip tt" influence the shape of any "line-item."
supplemental

appropriations

and

the

sequestration

The President can also request
procedure

provides

additional

opportunities for the Administration to influence the funding of particular programs.
We also feel the Congress, particularly as a result of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, has more than enough procedural constraints and
Jimitatie:ns on its budgetary powers.
Line-item veto authority could complicate and politicize the budget process in a
fashion that could be contrary to the national interest and at the same time have at best a
miniscule effect on the overalJ spending and revenue totals and the size of the deficit. It is
unlikely that line-item veto power would apply uniformly throughout the budget.

Rather,

for one reason or anothp.r, significant portions of the budget could or would not be subject to
the veto power. Interest on the national debt, a large ($170 billion) and fast growing lineitem, could not be subjected to a veto. Social security, medicare, unemployment assistance
and the like are all mandatory entitlements and substantial portions of the outlays for
otherwise "discretionary" programs and categories reflect contractual expenditures frornprior year authoriz3tions and could not be subject to a veto.
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-3The Budget for fiscal 1990, for example, categorizes $902.3 billion in outlays-7S.4
percent of the total budget-as "relatively uncontrollable" (page 10-26).
Although some of these programs perhaps are less "uncontrollable" than others, the
figure:; indicate clearly that the veto as a deficit reduction measure could have a very small
impact.

These figures also imply that the relatively few programs that are controllable

would be disproportionately burdened. This in our view could lead to a counter productive
game of budgetary "chicken" between the White House and th-e Congress with certain
programs held hostage by the Administration's veto power. Also, there is the potential for a
highly partisan White House to use the threat of veto power for electoral gain.
We do not feel that such circumstances would be conducive to the development of a
budget that reflects the nation's priorities and spells out the manner in which those
priorities will be financed.

Nor do we believe that the line-item veto accords with the

Congress' legislative authority as envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution.
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Second, even if an item is returned to Congress for override, it is
possible-quite possible, I think-that the Congress is going to be
reluctant to use its override power. The item veto, in a sense, presumes that the President knows better when it comes to fiscal
policy, and I think symbolically, Congress is going to be hesitant,
even with respect to a simple majority, to override those Presidential decisions.
Finally, on the balance of power issue, I don't think the item
veto restores the President's power, With respect to budgetary
power, the President does not have the vested right to have his
budget dominate the Government. The budget power for the President originates thr-ough the 1921 act, and that act clearly shows
fhat the Congress' budget priorities take precedence over that of
the President.
Moreover, with respect to omnibus measures, I think it is frequently misperceived that omnibus measures hurt the President
and help Congress. President Reagan's legislative master stroke, in
fact, was the 1981 Omnibus Act. There, he was a strong advocate of
omnibus measures as a way to eliminate waste in an efficient
manner.
Another example of omnibus measures expanding Presidential
po~!er is the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution. There, the
President was quite successful, having Congress concede with respect to Contra aid and the fairness doctrine, by threatening to use
his veto po\ver.
I would like to now move quickly to the question of judicial interpretation. As I said, words like "item" and words like "appropriation" may Inake perfect sense to you and I. But since the Constitution does not distinguish the authorization process from the appropriations process, there are going to be many problems of interpretation.
For example, is a condition on spending, such a limitation rider,
an appropriation? It is part of an appropriation bill. What about
budgetary matters contained in authorizations? They concern the
budget, but are they an appropriation or not? You know, for example, Congress can place its appropriations in authorizations measures. Does that protect the Congress from an item veto?
These matters are going to be subject to interpretation by the
courts and, as the States' experience demonstrates, we are going to
get conflicting interpretations. Therefore, you simply don't know
what you get with the item veto.
For these reasons, I think the item veto is a dangerous constitutional experiment.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Devins follows:]
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Senator SIMON. Thank you very much.
Prof. Neal Devins, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. We are happy to have you with us, Professor
Devins.
STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS
Mr. DEVINS. 1'hank you, Senator Simon. I appreciate the opportu-

nity. There are four principal objections to the item veto, some of
which have been said before; a couple, I will add.
First, as Senators Byrd and Hatfield have noted, the States' experience with the item veto is a mixed experience and has clearly
not been uniformly positive, especially with respect to partisan politics playing a large role.
Second, even if the States' experience was uniformly positive, as
was mentioned before by Senator Hatfield, from the States you
cannot analogize to the Federal budget process. There are simply
too many differences between the State and the Federal systems.
Third, with respect to the balance of power, and there has been
some discussion of this before as well, the item veto, even with the
simple majority override proposed through Senate Joint Resolution
23, will dramatically alter the balance between the President and
Congress in a manner that favors the President.
Moreover, the complaint that omnibus bills hurt the President, is
misplaced. The President frequently benefits from omnibus bills,
- even wIth respect to preserving his veto power.
Fourth, and finally, the item veto will be subject to judicial interpretation. While it might be clear in the minds of yourself and
other sponsors what words like "item" and "appropriation" mean,
it is probably not so clear in the eyes of the courts. The experience
of the State courts in determining the sweep of gubernatorial itemveto authority bears this out.
I would like to focus on my second two comments, the balance of
power concern and the concern over judicial interpretation.
With respect to the balance of power, it seems to me that when
the Congress and the President are of different parties, the likelihood for conflict with respect to the item veto is particularly acute.
The States' experience does bear this out. When Governor and
State legislature are of different parties, there are many item veto
conflicts.
Congress' override cannot protect against this phenomenon. I
have heard you and some of the other sponsors mention today that,
it is only a simple majority override, and therefore the override
will protect legislative prerogatives.
But it is important to keep two things in mind. First, the President controls that which is subject to being overridden in the first
place. Consequently, if the President favors a wasteful program, it
ifJ not subject to item veto at all because he keeps it and does not
veto it. It is only that which he feels he affirmatively vetoes that is
presented to the.Congres8 for possible override.
This, of course, will preserve his priorities. It may also protect
the priorities of powerful legislators that the President does not
wa nt to upset through the use of his item-veto power.
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STATEMENT OF NEAL DEVINS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW,
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
Chairman Simon and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss proposed constitutional amendments to
authorize an item veto for the President. My remarks will focus on S.J. Res. 14 authorizing the President to "disapprove any item of appropriation" subject to traditional
two-thirds override - and S.J .Res. 23 - empowering the President to "reduce or
disapprove any item of appropriation" subject to majority override.
Sponsor statements in support of these proposals are drawn by two impulses.
First, Congress lacks sufficient "fiscal discipline" to Significantly reduce the federal
deficit. Reliance on "staff, and the knowledge,

cha~acter,

and ability of

th~

subcommittee chairman and ranking Members" has proven inadequate. Gr&mm-RudmanHollings, at present, appears little more than "blue smoke and mirrors." President Bush,
moreover, has suggested numerous costly initiatives. Immediate action is therefore
necessary. While the item_veto is not a panacea, it is a necessary forward step. Portythree states have it and "it works." Furthermore, Congressional approval of the item
veto sends "a clear message to the American public that we are making a serious effort
to get our fiscal house in order." Second, the increasing use of omnibus legislation has
weakened the President's veto. The item veto therefore "helps restore" the appropriate
balance of power between President and Congress. At the same time, in the case of S.J.
Res. 23, concern over the possible "creation of an imperial presidency" cautions against a
super-majority override and in favor of override by a "simple constitutional majority."
"Stated another way," S.J. Res. 23 sees the item veto as a mechanism to ensure that a
majority of legislators actually supports items in previously enacted bills.
An examination of state experiences with the item veto 8.nd President Reagan's
experiences with omnibus legislation raises doubts about both propositions. Problems of
judicial interpretation and escalating interbranch connict likewise cautions against these
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1. The Item Veto and the Fisc
Proponents of a presidential item veto as a tool to redress the chronic inability of
the federal government to control spending and budget deficits point to the fact that
most governors have this authority. Yet, state experience with the item veto has been
unquestionably mixed.
The item veto has a-reputation for saving money and some evidence supports this
characterization) Several studies, however, call into question the item veto's
effectiveness for reducing expenditures. As Senator Mark Hatfield, who was governor of
Oregon from 1958-1966, testified before this Committee in 1984:
Legislators in states which have the line-item veto routinely
"pad" their budgets. It is a wonderful way for a Democraticcontrolled legislature to put a Republican Govemor on the
spot: Let him be the one to line-item these issues that were
either politically popular, or very emotional.2
Studies from Pennsylvania and Michigan support this conclusion.3
Available evidence, moreover, suggests that the item veto often functions as a
partisan political tool and causes strife between the executive and legislative branches in
state government. A 1935 study comparing 28 states found the item veto more likely to
be used in states where the legislature and governor were flOm opposing parties.

4

A

1986 Wisconsin study likewise concluded that the item veto has been used primarily as a .
tool of polley making and partisan politics.5 A 1985 review of nllnois Governor
Thompson's use of the item veto concluded that the veto triggered numerous political
battles.6 Finally, a 1984 review by the House Budget Committee concluded that "hlhe
power of the Une-item veto on the states has given rise to significant poUtical strife
which has, at times f threatened the shutdown of Govemment services and withholding of
peyments.,,7
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from lump sum funding to single item funding. Such a change would eliminate existing
advantages to Congress and executive agencies associated with lump sum funding.
Preexisting budgetary demands also speak against a presidential item veto. Half
of Il1l federal outlays are not contained in appropriations. Entitlements such as Social
. Security and Medicare as well as interest on the national debt are all within the
jurisdiction of the tax committees. Moreover, appropriations which further presidential
priorities are effectively veto proof. For example, in light of President Reagan's
commitment to maintaining defense spending, a Reagan administraHon item veto-at
best-would have applied to less than fifteen percent of the budget. Indeed, the
President's 1985 Economic Report

~luntly

proclaimed that the item veto "may not have a

substantial effect on total federal expenditures" but may be used by the President "to
change the composition of federal expenditures-from activities preferred by the
Congress to activities preferred by the President. "11
A Bush-era item veto might well operate much the same way. As Senator Dixon
recognized: "Let us not forget a number of costly initiatives have been discussed by
President Bush. Where does the money

~ome

for these initiatives when the deficit

continues to eat away at our ability to meet the needs of the country."
2. The Item Veto and the Balance of Power
The item veto's role as fiscal salvo tells only part of the proponent's story.
Proponents also argue that the item veto restores-in the face of veto-proof omnibus
legislation-essenti&l presidential power. Irrespective of whether the framers would
approve of a presidential item veto,12 I find this argument shortsighted. Omnibus
legislation has not proven the downfall of either the presidency or the veto power. I 3
President Reagan, for example, was w'ell served by the 1981 Omnibus
ReconeUiation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "the omnibus nature of the bill was
championed by the White nouse and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts
in popul&r program••"14 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, moreover, did not
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More significant, even if the states' experiences with the item veto were
uniformly positive, state govemments are too different from the federal govemment to
serve as useful models for a presidential item veto. Unlike state constitutions, which
have a strong antilegislative bias, a balanced budget requirement, and speC!lfic controls
on the prooess of authorizing and appropriating funds, the federal Constitution contains
few limitations on the spending power and is silent on the procedures to be adopted by
Congress to authorize and appropriate funds. 8
Congress may today appropriate by tax committees, legislative committees, and
appropriations committees. If Congress chose to do so, it could place subsu.ntive
legislation in appropriations bills and allow authorization committees to fund programs
directly through the use of "backdoor spending." These matters are left exclusively to
House and Senate rules and to Congress' interpretation and execution of its rules. Unlike
states that include specifications for the style and format of appropriations bills,
Congress may decide to appropriate only in large, lump sum amounts, eliminating from
the bill specific projects and activities that the President hoped to veto. In fact,
Congress and the executive agencies both prefer lump sum funding to accommodate the
need for administrative discretion. 9 To protect its interests, Congress relies to a large
extent on nonstatutory controls, specifying the allocation of lump sum amounts in such
places as committee reports. IO Unless Congress substantially alters the structure of
appropriations bills, the item veto would give the President little additional control over
individual projects, programs, or activities.
Item reduction power would strengthen the President's hand in this regard.
Presumably, the President could eliminate unnecess~ pork from omnibus "items."
There are two problems here. First, the President is under no obligatio.... to expend a
"reduced" appropriation in a manner which Congress approves. The reduced

appropriation simply means that some approved expenditures will not go forward.
""~f

in order to exereiH meanil1l'ful control, Congress may be foreed to move away
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from lump sum funding to single item funding. Such a change would eliminate existing
advantages to Congress and executive agencies associated with lump sum funding.
Preexisting budgetary demands also speak against a presidential item veto. Half
of till federal outlays are not contained in appropriations. Entitlements such as Social
. Security and Medicare as well as interest on the national debt are all within the
jurisdiction of the tax committees. Moreover, appropriations which further presidential
priorities are effectively veto proof. For example, in light of President Reagan's
commitment to maintaining defense spending, a Reagan administrat:on item veto-at
best-would have applied to less than fifteen percent of the budget. Indeed, the
President's 1985 Economic Report bluntly proclaimed that the item veto "may not have a
substantial effect on total federal expenditures" but may be used by the President "to
change the composition of federal expenditures-from activities preferred by the
Congress to activities preferred by the President."11
A Bush-era item veto might well operate much the same way. As Senator Dixon
recognized: "Let us not forget a number of costly initiatives have been discussed by
President Bush. Where does the money \!ome for these initiatives when the deficit
continues to eat away at our ability to meet the needs of the country."
2. The Item Veto and the Balance of Power
The item veto's role as fiscal salvo tells only part of the proponent's story.
Proponents also argue that the item veto restores-in the face of veto-proof omnibus
legislation-essential presidential power. Irrespective of whether the framers would
approve of a presidential item veto,12 I find this argument shortsighted. Omnibus
legislation hai': not prov~n the downfall of either the presidency or the veto power. 13
President Reagan, for example, was well served by the 1981 Omnibus
Reconciliation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "the omnibus nature of the bill was
championed by the White nouse and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts

In populAr programs . ."14 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, moreover, did not

'.~
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undermine the veto power. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature of the
exchange

be~ween

the White House and Congress, the veto still functions as a mediating

device. For e)"ample, with respect to the FY 88 continuing resolution, the White House
and Congress undertook

exter~ive n~otiations

to ensure that the bill was satisfactory to

both sides. In the ,end, Congress abandonc1 the fairness doctrine and included Contra aid

to stave off a threatened veto. If anything, such legislative \!Ompromises reveal that a
President who is wilUng to u:"',e his veto wields enormous t.'0wer in such negotiations.
The vitality of the veto power therefore cannot be measured by its exercise.
Rather, the effectiveness of the veto power must be measured by h:s impact on the
political process. The "all <.'r nothing" stakes of omnibus legislation enabled President
Reagan to enhance his veto power through a threatened exercise. As a matter of simple
mathematics, frequency of use is also a poor measure of the veto power's impact. Prior
to the present era of omnibus

lel~islation,

the presidential veto has been infrequent.1.y

used. IS Washington vetoed only two bills. Seven presidents never used the power. Two

presidents (Roosevelt and Cleveland) account for roughly half of all vetoes. In short,
while the veto power may be underutilized, the advent of omnibus legislation is not the
cause of infrequent use.
The item veto, moreover, cannot be understood as a mechanism to restore
essential presidential prerogatives in the budget process. Prior to 1921, the President
had no final budgetary responsibilities. The Budget Act of 1921 r£quired the President to

submit a formal

bu~et.

At the same time, Congress was free to do with the budget as it

saw fit. The 1974 Budget Act, while setting explicit limits on the President's
impoundment authority, did not alter this basic relationship. Item veto and reduction,
bowver, will alter this basic relationship. As Louis Fisher observed in pri?r testimony on

u.e item veto:

"The final size and shape of the budget will resemble to a much greater

deIree what the President submitted."IB
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J. Res. 23 proponents say fear not; Congress's simple majority override

will preserve legislative priorities. Specifically, S.J. Res: 23 envisions the item veto as a
I

•

check on items which are not supp<)rted by a majority of either House. While it is
undoubtedly true that a byproduct of legislative

cOnlpr~mise

is the enactment of items

that do not stand on their own, the creation of a "super Congress" in the Oval Office is
surprising.
Bicameralism and presentment presume that a majority in both [Houses] think it
better to vote in favor of a bill than against it. While another enactment might be more
pleasing, all bills presumably further Congress's will. In contrast, S.J. Res. 23,
recognizing the realities of legislative delegation and horse trading, views many
provisions as inconsistent with t.he legislative will. On a provision by provision basis,
there is little doubt that this contention is true. Yet, when one views the legislative_
work product as a conglomeration of enactments, the delegation of authority to
ccmmittee heads and the striking of compromises may well further congressional
objenth·es. The item veto will undoubtedly affect this dynamic.
More significant, the President has his own agenda and presumably will use the
item veto to superimpose his priorities upon Congress. Granted, under S.J. Res. 23, a
simple majority override is available. Congress, however, may hesitate before it acts
against ostensible fiscal restraint by the President.. Furthermore, the President decides
which items are subject to override. Since personal taste and partisan politics will
preserve some programs at least as wasteful as those item vetoed, the item veto is a
boon to presidential prerogatives. Needless to say, the two-thirds override required by
S.J. Res. 14 is an even greater expansion of executive power..17
This expansion of presidential power is likely to encourage political connict. The
Item veto invites the President to resist compromises and negotiations with Congress.
Symbolically, the item veto presumes that the "President knows better" when it comes to
budretary matters. The President also expends little political capital when he exercises
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this power. Consequently, the President is likely to make use of this budgetary tool. 18

Sinc" ideology and partisanship will infiuen\!e his use of the item veto, connects between
the branches-as the

states~

experiences reveal-are likely to arise. This connict may

well result in substantial delays in the enactment of appropriations bills and uncertainty
on the part of agencies, state governments, and private

citize~

regarding their funding

levels.
3. The Item Veto and the Courts
The item veto, of course, will be subject to judicial interpretation and hence some
attention should be paid to the interpretation controversies surrounding the gubernatorial
item veto.19
S.J. Res. 14 and S.J.Res. 23 both envision the item veto as extendi~to "any item
of apprclpriation." But what is an "item"?
Must it be a sentence or. a clause or a word? Must it

~~ 6.

section, or any part of a section, that may meet with e'tecutive
disapprobation? May a conditional or a contingent
appropriation be transformed into an absolute one, in disregard
and defiance of the legislative will?20

By the same token, what is an "appropriation"? Is it any matter in an appropriation bill
or is it any fiscal matter in any bill?
The range of approaches taken by state judges illustrates the possible reach of
judicial authority in interpreting these terms. State court interpretations differ on
several fundamental issuE"s. Some courts emphasize legislative prerogatives, others

stNII gubernatorial authority. Some courts are literalists in their interpretation of this
power, others consider the context in which the governor exercises item veto power.
State courts also differ in their understanding of whether the

~ercise

of item veto

authority is a positive or negative act. Furthermore, these courts are often unable to
understand the complexities of the budgetary process. Questions concerning spending
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that occuI"'';; outside

tI'H;'

a.ppropriations processc for example, have frustrated se"eral state

courts.
Because tile courts of different states have a.dopted different perspectives,
idantical item veto provisions have received quite different interpretations. If the
President is granted item veto authority, the federal judiciary will be embroiled in some
of

th~

same issues presented in state C'')urts. Federal budgetary decisions are frequently

made outside the appropriations process. Moreover, Congress often attaches conditions
to appropriations bills. 21 For example, Congr'ess has attached riders to appropriations
bills that have prohibited federal funding of abortion, restricted American military
activity during the Vietnam War, and limited efforts by the Internal Revenue Service to
ensure thl1t private school operations are nondiscriminatory.
Because so many aspects of the federal lawmaking process are incompatible with
the item veto, such presidential authority would be subject to more extensive and more

complicated litigation than the gubernatorial item veto. Federal appropriations bills do
not currently contain specific items. Additionally, because the federal Constitution does
not distinguish between appropriations and authorizations, Congress may seek to limit a
presitjential item veto by funding projects either through the authorization process or
indirectly through tax laws. The federal courts would inevitably be called upon to
resolve these ambiguities by dra wing discrete lines of power between the President and

In the states, court rulings have been instrumental in establishing the scope of the

gubernatorial item veto. Federal court rulings, undoubtedly, would play an equally
significant role in determining the reach of the Presidf?nt's item veto authority. The
federal judiciary might insist that congressional intent be
item veto to dollar amounts .. On the ottier hand, courts

pr.eserved~

migh~~

thus limiting the

view th(l! item veto a5 a

vast e)'!;e(!utive powe" and allow the President to veto conditions on
UOOr"!f either scenario, the delicate ba1an~,<! of power between the
/

be disrupted by jUdicial [interpretation].
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Conclusion
Item veto proponents do not pretend that this deticit reduction tool will remedy
this nation's fiscal woes. Nonetheless, proponents are too optimistic in their rosy
assessment of both the states' experience and the President's ability to serve as
ncnpartisan deficit reduction czar. Proponents also overstate the damage caused to the
President's veto by megab!Us. Finally, proponents have not considered the judiciary's
role in defining the item veto power.
Great uncertainty surrounds the item veto. A constitutional amendment-which
presuma.bly will grant the President item veto power now and forever more-is a poor
device for an item veto experiment.

,;,," "" ,~
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Senator SIMON. Thank you very, very rnuch.
Dr. Louis Fisher, Senior Am~~rican Specialist, Government Division, Congressional Research Service.
Dr. Fisher.
STATEMENT OF LOUIS FISHER

Mr. FISHER. Thank you. I wanted to focus on the question you
and others have raised of how much would be saved by an item
veto given to the President. Would it be 10 percent, or $30 billion,
or what? And what about the State analogy?
I think a very concrete example of what might be saved was prepared by the Office of Management and Budget last year. If you
remember, in December IH87, President Reagan signed a monster
continuing resolution, and 'what he did in March was to send back
to Congress a document that stated that if I had the item veto
p01Ner at the time the CR came to me, this is \vhat I would item
veto.
It is very clearly stated in here. Someone in OMB went through
the CR and, with a black pen, boxed out what Reagan would have
item vetoed. There are several things interesting here.
First of all, that huge continuing resolution contained about $600
billion, and we know the budget for that y'ear was about $1 trillion.
So it means that more than 40 percent of what is appropriated
every year bypasses the President because it is in permanent appropriation, requiring no annual action. So that part of the picture
is simply never going to be subject to a President's item veto.
Now, in the $(-)00 billion, the OMB was able to find $1.5 billion
that he would have liked to iten1 veto. That is really not an answer
for budget deficits, and even the $1.{) is very overstated because
half of that amount consists-not dollars in the appropriation bill,
but of 1egislative language, particularly for the Small Business Administration. That is a question that you can consider. Do you
wa nt a President to item veto not just dollar amounts or also legisla tive language?
Another interesting point in this document is that someone in
OMB went through the continuing resolution and struck not the
dollar amounts, but the proviso, because Congress frequently says
here is money provided that it is spent in this way.
This has caused tremendous confusion in the State courts. Can a
Governor accept an appropriation that has a condition attached to
it 1 keep the moneyt and cut off the condition? Can the Governor
take a conditional appropriation and convert it into an uncondi~
tional appropriation? Is that an executive act? Or is it a legislative
act, because he is creating som~thing that the legislative body
never imagined?
I have read probably 120, laO decisions by State judges on the
item veto, and they have neVl~r been able to map out any sort of
coherent theory on h()w to cabin the Governors' item-veto author..
ity.
So I would underscore whut Professor Devins said, that even
though there is consti tutional language, it is a free for all once it is
e"ercised by an ambitious executive, and the scope of item·veto aU
thority is resolved fai r ly much in the courts. I don't think Federal
N
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more successful than State judges in being able
to come up with some principled way to interpret item-veto power.
What about allowing the President to cut provisos and conditions
and qualifications? As you know, to get a bill through, you have to
agree to various compromises, and only then can it leave the legislative body and go to the President.
I suggest two examples. One would interest a conservative; the
second would interest a liberal. At the present time, we appropriate money for Medicaid and there is a proviso and a condition that
it not be spent for abortion, with some conditions.
Could a President receive money for Medicaid--say, a liberal
President-and cut off that proviso and use it for abortion? With
regard to conservatives, the only way in recent years you have
been able to provide money for the Contras is to provide certain
conditions that it not be used for lethal aid, that it be for humanitarian purposes.
Could a President receive $50 million, $100 million for the Contras, on the condition that it not be used for lethal aid, and strike
out that proviso? This is a power that goes far beyond the question
cutting money and saving money and addressing the deficit. This
to the whole arrangement by which we make laws in Congress.
Thank you very much .
"~,.,.,
statement of M r. Fisher foHows:]
........

.. ".i"'•

.ri
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TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSION.~ RESEARCH SED,VICE,
HEARINGS ON THE ITEAI VE1'O, BEFORE
THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE ,fUDICARY, APRIL 1'1, 1989

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuSIJ the issue of giving the
President the power to delete individual items from appropriations bills. My remarks will
focus on the constitutional amendment you have cosponsored with Senator Dixon (S.J.
Res. 23). I will also look more broadly at the effect of an item v'eta on budget deficits,
executive-legislative relations, congressional spending prerogatives, the budget process, and
the new duties that would be placed on federal courts.
First, I think the item veto is oversold as a weapon against the current level of
budget deficits.

Evidence for my statement comes from documents prepared by the

Reagan administration. On March 14, 1988, President Reagan sent to Congress a list of
"wasteful, unnecessary, or low priority spending projects" in the continuing resoiution for
fiscal 1988 (P.L. 100-202). He claimed that he would have deleted those projects "if I
were able to exercise line item veto authority."'
This document therefore provides a very tangible measure of potential savings from
the item veto. The continuing resolution contained $603.9 billion in budget authority,
translating to about $593.2 billion in outlays. (The balance of the trillion dollar budget

(or tisciJJ 1988 was funded through

I

pe'rm~nent

appropriations, requiring no action through

H. Doc. No. 100-174, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988).

annual bills). The list of spending cuts

by Reagan, to be achieved through the

item veto, came only to $969.6 million in budget

in outlays.

Even this $1.5 billion in potential

have

resulted from deleting legislative language for the Sn:.aH

UUilUUICl:Nt

AllmlmstrBltlCln

outlays by $728 million. Does the item veto permit deletion not only of
(dollar amounts) but legislative language as
the item veto applies only to appropriated

~ppropriations

turn to that

later, but if

8mlOulnts,

be substantially less than a billion. That is not an answer to

deficits in the range

of $150 billion a year.
sufficient votes to

'The item veto might even increase
support a costly presidential initiative,

and White House aides could inform

Senators and Representatives that particular proJecu m their states or districts are
would escape no

candidates for the item veto. At the same

one, these executive officials could then inquire mto the mtentions of the legislators when
the President's program is being voted on the

n9t

week.

established, resulting in the retention of the leglslaton'
President's program.

A quid pro quo could be
and also passage of the

Under thOle pre.ures the roet of government

wou~d

go up.

Presidents could &lao uae item-veto power as e:tn leverage for getting treaties and
nomin_

throup

the Senate and pursuing other \\<"1£.. House objectives.

This brinp me into the area of executive-legIslative relations. I think the net effect
of item-veto power will not be budget savings but rather a preference for executive
spending priorities over legislative spending priorities. I call your attention to a candid
appraiAl in the Economic Report in 1985, which concluded that the item veto "may not
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have a substantial effect on total Federal expenditures" but may be used by the President
"to change the composition of Federal expenditu res - from activities preferred by the
CongresE, to activities preferred by the Preeident:2 Administration officials have been
equally forthright in the past, explaining that the item veto would be
that Congress had added to the Presidenes

ai~ed

at amounts

budget.~

The same conclusi,"ln is reached by studies at the state leveL The item veto is
wielded not as an instrument for fiscal restraint but to further the spending goals of the
executive branch. Of course the record varies from state to stJlt.e, depending on unique
circumstances in their economies, politics, and pubiic laws. However, the general picture
does not support the use vf the item veto for budget savinp. It is used instead for
political and partisan

advantages.~

If 43 states have adopted the item veto, why doesn't the Federal Government follow
their lead? Part of the answer, I believe, comes from the special significance of "power
of the purse" at ths national level. The framers recognized that the long struggle for
representative government in England evolved from Parliament gaining the power of the
purse. In making the President Commander in Chief, the framers deliberately separated
the power of the sword from the power of the purse. The fusion of those two powers at

2

Economic Report or the President 95 <Feb. 1985).

3 "Item Veto,· hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1957).
4 For example, see Nice, "The Item Veto and bpenditure Restraint," 50
J. Pol. 487 (1988); Gosling, "Wisconsin Item-Veto Leaaona: 46 Pub. Adm. Rev.
292 (1986); Abney & Lauth, "The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument
for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Parti88D8hip?,. 45 Pub. Adm. Rev.
372 (1985).
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the national level represents a much greater tm-eat to individual liberties than

:ne

state level. There are other reasons why the Federal Govenlment has not

the

itern veto, and I will detail some of those later.
The question of subordinating Congress to the President's budget has been
addressed many times. 'Nhen the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was being drafted,
some reformers recommended that Congress be prohibited n'om adding to the President's
budget. Others proposed that Congress would have to seek the approval of the Secretary
of the Treast ry, or muster a two-thirds majority in each House, in order to add to the
President's budget. ti
Congress rejected all of those pre
pursuant to the Budget and Acce
President was responsible fc
with Congress given
made in committ·
in any

~11e

also

The budget submitted by the President

llmg Act was executive only in the sense that the

estimates. Thereafter it became

I:i

legislative budget,

power to increase or reduce his estimates. Increases could be

ur on the floor by simple majority vote. The act did not contemplate

the surrender of congressional power.

It did not make Congress

subordinate to the President's spending plan. 6
This drama was replayed when President Nixon resorted to unprecedented use of
the

powe~

to impound funds. The messag'C from the \\'hile House came across without

equivocation: congressional add-ons to the President's budget were irresponsible and
wholly lacking in merit. Through impoundment, programs were either cut back to the

IS L. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President
233 (1985).
8

H. Kept. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st

Se8B.

6·7 (1921).
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Casl~S,

President's request or, in some

terminat.ed and dismanted. 7

This theory of

presidential power was repudiated in almost every case decided by federal judges.
Congress responded by passing

tb,~

Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

Some

iegislators thought that the President's impoundment should remain in effect unless one
House, or both Houses, acted to disapproye.

For example, in 1973 the House of

Representatives conaidered legislation to ret]uire both Houses ...,.rithin SO days to
disapprove an impoundment. As reported and passed by the House, disapproval required
disapproval only by a single chamber.

Howt!Y~r,

the Senate insisted that the President

obtain the approval of both Houses. Placing the

on the Pretiident was crucial.

Senator Sam Ervin argued that it would have been demeaning to Congress as an
institution to act three times to impose its spending priorities: passing

b.!1

initial bill,

overturning the President's veto of that bill, and acting a third time to overturn an
impoundment proposal.
These experiences in 1921 and 1974 bear on the

item-vl~to

power. The struggle for

spending priorities takes place throughout the process of passing appropriation,
authorization, and revenue bills.

At each stage of that process the executive and

legislative branches compete for what is added and what is deleted. At some point a
compromise product is

pre~nted

to the President, who may either aign or veto the bill.

Each branch, in that pr0C888, has the opportunity to influence the cont.ent of the bill.
Permitting the President to item veto the finished bill gives the

l~xecutive

branch

a decided advantage. Even if the override requires only a simply majority, as with S.J.

7

1" Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 175·201 (1975).
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Res. 23, it is highly unlik(ely that Congress c.a.n prevail in these conflicts. Tb~ past two
centuries demonstrate that overrides are exceptionally difficult and generallY f.)ccur when
the President vetoes a general bill, not a specific bill.Following this analogy, an item veto of a specific program~would be less likely to
klrecipitate a congressioD:Il1 override. Members of Congress from tbe smaller states would
find it especiaUy difficult to attn. ..
states with

on~y

Ie votes of colleagues to override the President. The

one or two members in the HOlJse of Representatives '!..vould have little

chance of achieving an override of a vetoed item, e\""cn with

9.

simpie majority.

These remarks suggest that the item veto might be an effectiv'e way to eliminate
"wasteful" items added by Congress. Part of the motivation for the item veto comes from
the belief that Congress irresponsibly adds unwanted riders and amendments to the
President's requeste. Only with the item veto, it is argued, can the President protect his
proposed budget frem these extraneous add-ons.
How this works out in practice is difficult to predict. I thin:lt that the availability
of an item veto might well make Congress less responsible. Under the present system,
members of Congress are restrained in adding to a bill because they know, at some point,
that add-ons will invite a presidential veto. With an item veto, however, the restraint
would be 1988.

To satisfy constituent demands, each member could add extraneous

material tn a bill with the understanding among all mem'ben that the President

i~

free

to strike the offending amendment. Why challenge these add-ons. in committee or on the

I Bellamy, "Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Prasidential
Power?," 22 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 557, 576 (1988).
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floor? Why not shift the responsibility to the Presid~nt and his
of adopting a refoi"1D to control logrolling, the item veto

advisers? Instead
enCOU1"8p' this practice.

Third, let me tum to some other implications for the
sense to

giv~

process. It makes no

the President an item veto if thp.re are no items in the bills he receives.

Unlike the states, which itemize their appropriations bills in great detail

to

such amounts as $2500 for the governor to veto), the spending bills
President contain lump sums. As an

example~

to the

take a look at the

conat.ru.ction

account of the Gorps
of Engineers, which is regularly accused
of prClmOtlng
,
.

nl1lrllC' •• nAlM"Sl'I-

projects. The Energy'and Water Development Appropriations Act for fiscal 1989 provides
$1,066,735,000 for river a'ld harbor, flood control, shore pnltecbon, and related

n'l"l".lOl't<l:ll

9

To determine how that lump sum is to be spent, one must tum to th conference report,
which spells out in painstaking detail the Qmount8 that go to individua:
state. These amounts range from a low of $~f).OOO to

nrl'llPll"t..a

in each

Ii

The point is that none of those project5 {which number almost
subject to the President's item veto. They appear n t.he conference

would be
not the bill.

The misconceptions in this area 8re immenae. In Janusry 1988, in his State of the
Union Message, President Reagan claimed that with the item veto he could have "pared

away the waste" in the omnibus appropriation bill he received the previous December.
To illustrate the programs he would have item-vetoed, he gave four examples: cranberry

9

102 Stat. 858 (1988).

!O H. Rept. No. 100-724, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1988). This table
lists $118,000,000 for the Red River Waterway project in Louisiana, but that
amount is provided for separately in the appropriations bili and is not part
of the $1,066,735,000.
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research, blueberry research, the study of CL8.wfi.h, and the commercialization of
wildflowers. ''''he simple fact is that he could not have item-vetoed any of the programa
he mentioned. They were all in the conference report.
Of course it is possible for Congresa to take the detail in the conference report and
place it in the bills presented to the President. To that extent we could copy the example
of the states. There would be two drawbec1u. If Preeidentl complain about the &:ze of
appropriations bills tiiey receive today, the problem would be magnified many times O\'er
by including the detailed tables that appear in conference rtport.l.

More

importantly~

adding such details to the bill that bece-mes a public law would rigidify the administrative
process. This point deserves some elaboration.
Lump-sum funding offers many advantage&

to

executive agencies. By receiving a

lump sum of one billion dollars for construction prGjecta. the Corps of Engineers gains
valuable flexibility in expending those fundB throughout the fiecal year. If one project '
is slowed and another encounters unexpected expenses, funds can be "reprogrammed"
within the 8"count to meet these needs. Itemization w",uld lock t hese details into public
law. Funds could not be moved from one project to another without paaing another
public law. Neither branch wants that rigidity. Congress bas enough problems passing
public laws u it is.
This i8 one important difference between the Federal Government and the states.
We don't itemize appropriations bills; states do. I see no compelling case to imitate the
states in this regard. But there are other fundamental differences between the Federal
Government !lIld t.he states, all of which have been spelled out in some detail in an article
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that Neal Devins and I did for the

ue.r;"M~to:w1&

II

Copies of that

article have been made available to your Subcommittee.
I will dose with some oOOernltiona about the pouible
the federal courts.

S.J. Res. 23 .would

of the item veto on

the Preeident

tc

"reduce or

disapprove any item of appropriation in any Act or joint resolution, except any item of
appropriation for the legislative branch of the Government," I don't bave space here to
detail the difficulties that state court.s have encountered in tryiag to define "item" and
"appropriation."

Part of the problems have been explsined in our article for the

Georgetown Law Journal. A few observations

win SUi9;rei,t the dimensions of the problem.

What is an "appropriation"? Does it include alternative methods of funding a federal
program, such as a bond authorization or a
to finance a program? How much could

of generating revenues that are used
the President's item veto by

creating a variety of special funds and accounts? Such questions have required state
courts to examine budgetary issues of excruciating complexity, taxing the competence of
judges and thrusting them often in the middle of

leRjlllllti·ve-ex.~u.ti\l·e

confrontations.

What is an "item"? II it only the dollar amount or also a word? The problems here
have been legion, with governors deleting individual words and even separate letters. The
result has been the creation of statutory language never intended by the legislature. Can
the executive delete language, including conditions attached to an appropriation?
Probably no issue has confused the state courts more. Through the use of the item veto

JI
Fisher & Devins, ~ow Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be
Transferred to the President?," 75 Gee. L. J. 159 (1986).
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can a governor convert a conditional appropriation into an unconditional appropriation?
Is that an "executive" act or does it more closely resemble a "legislative" act, producing in
effect a

n~w

law?

State courts, after struggling with these questions for the last century, have yet to
discover a set of coherent principles to guide their decisions. Many state judges recognize
that their efforts in defining the scope of the item veto have been largely subjective, ad
hoc, and idiosyncratic. There is little reason to think that federal judges

win

be more

successful. Federal courts will be drawn increasingiy into budgetary disputes between
Congress and the President. Moreover, the scope of the item veto win be defined not by
constitutional language but by an uncertain and fluctuating combination of presidential
initiatives and judicial rulings.
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Senator SIMON. Thank you. Just for the record, so there is no
question about our intent, we are not talking about the President
vetoing legislative language or changing the intent by vetoing provisos. We are talking only about dollar amounts.
Let me just ask one question of all of you because, clearly, we
face a major problem. My friend from the AFL-CIO joins me in
wanting to have more money for education, more money for health
care, and so forth. But I see interest growing just-you know, the
fastest growing item in the budget is interest.
The gross interest expenditure growth in fiscal year 1990 over
fiscal year 1989 will be greater than the total amount that we
spend on all of our education programs, if you exclude the School
Lunch Program. You know, we are not meeting the kinds of needs
that we ought to be meeting.
Have any of you thought at all about strengthening the rescission powers that the President has, and would you be in favor of
anything that would in any way strengthen that at all, if I may
ask all three of you that?
Mr. CANTOR. I really haven't thought about it, quite frankly. It
seems to me tnat the current rescission po\vers of the President are
adequate, and I would be remiss, Senator, if I didn't get OH the
record that I am a little troubled by the entire hearing's exclusive
emphasis on the spending side of the equation every time the issue
of how this can help on the deficit conles up.
You know, as you articulated, \ve certainly share your feelings
about education and training and public investment programs. I
don't see how a measure geared to budget deficit reduction could
help in those areas, if any nloney that is saved is used to reduce
the deficit, You are certainly not putting the expenditures in other
places.
I was kind of disturbed t hat the revenue side of the budget
hasn't been mentioned at all in this.
Senator SIMON. Well, I am one \vho is on the Budget Committee;
I have been clear. I think we have to have additional revenue, but
it is tied in with the deficit. You reduce a $2.7 trillion indebtedness,
and you reduce interest rates 1 percent.
Mr. CANTOR. Sure.
Senator SIMON. While the first year you don't save $27 billion,
you will ultimately save $27 billion a year, plus. And if you use
one-half of that to reduce the deficit and the other one-half for programs that this country needs, we would be infinitely better off all
the way around, in addition to the very fact that reducing interest
rates would stimulate the economy.
Any comments by either of you on the rescission?
Mr. DEVINS. Assuming that it is the proposal now before Congress in which the burden is placed on both Houses of Congress to
override a rescission, you are going to face many of the same problems that you do with the item veto. Take the problem of the President exercising his priorities over those of Congress. Even assuming that is a simple majority override, it will be difficult for Congress to strike back at the President. First, the President controls
that which is rescinded and, second, Congress will have difficulty
being able to even muster a simple majority override.
A
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Problems on the item-veto side of the equation are not solved by
utilizing an enhanced rescission mechanism.
Senator SIMON. Dr. Fisher.
Mr. FISHER. I would be concerned about enhanced rescission.
Right now the way the process works, legislators get a chance to
have their priorities in the bill, the executive branch has a chance,
and a bargain has been struck and it goes up to the President. If he
doesn't like it, then he can veto the whole thing.
To have the burden reversed so that he can propose certain rescissions and the burden is placed on both Houses to act within a
certain time to disapprove-and if they disapprove, of course, it
would have to be in a\,bill or joint resolution, which would go back
to the President and he could veto that. Now they need a twothirds to maintain their priorities.
I talk about that a little in my paper, and I think that is a very
ill advised process where Congress, in order to protect
priorities,
needs an extraordinary majority, a tvvo-thirds in each House. Otherwise, the President's priorities prevail.
That was debated in 1921 on the Budget and Accounting Act; it
was debated again in 1974 with the Budget Act. Congress every
time has ahvays insisted that it act just through 11lajority vote
unless the President exercised a regular veto.
Senator SIMON. I thank vou verv, very much for vour testimony.
Our hearing stands adjolirned. ~
~
~
~
[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.ll)', the subconunittee \\'as adjourned.]
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